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MANDATORY MATERNITY LEAVE: TITLE VII
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Many school boards have instituted mandatory maternity leave poli-
cies which require pregnant teachers to commence maternity leave at
predetermined times during their pregnancy.' The teachers contend
that the question of when to begin maternity leave is an individual
decision to be made by the mother with the advice of her physician.?
On the other hand, the school boards argue that these policies are
necessary for administrative convenience,8 educational continuity,4 and
protection of the mother and child.5 Lacking a statutory remedy until
recently, pregnant teachers have attacked mandatory maternity leave
policies as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This constitutional argument has prevailed in a majority
of the jurisdictions which have considered the question,6 but several
1. The time at which a teacher has been required to terminate employment has
varied from the fourth to eighth month of pregnancy. See, e.g., Green v. Waterford Bd.
of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973) (leave after five months violated equal
protection); La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), revg
326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), cert. granted, 41 US.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 24,
1973) (leave after four months violated equal protection); Schattman v. Texas Em-
ployment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'g 330 F. Supp. 328 (WD. Tex. 1971),
cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1973) (leave after seven months did not
violate equal protection); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp.
438 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (leave after seven months violated equal protection); Monell v.
Department of Social Serv., 4 EPD 7765 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (leave after seven months
violated equal protection).
2. E.g., Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ, No. 72-1676 (2d Cir., Jan. 29, 1973); Cohen
v. Chesterfield County School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir., Jan. 15, 1973), ree'g 326 F.
Supp. 1159 (ED. Va. 1971), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1973).
3. See notes 81-84 infra & accompanying text.
4. See note 85 infra & accompanying text.
5. See note 86 infra & accompanying text.
6. Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973) (leave after
five months violated equal protection); La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184
(6th Cir. 1972), rev'g 326 F. Supp. 1208 (ND. Ohio 1971), cert. granted, 41 U.SL.W.
3565 (US. Apr. 24, 1973) (mandatory leave after four months violated equal protection);
Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (leave
after seven months violated equal protection); Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37
(D. Colo. 1972) (discharge of a pregnant WAF violated due process); Pocklington v.
Duval County School Bd., 345 F. Supp. 163 (ND. Fla. 1972) (leave after four and a half
months violated equal protection); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (ND.
M11. 1972) (leave after five months violated equal protection); Monell v. Department
of Social Serv., 4 EPD 7765 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (leave after seven months violated equal
protection); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972)
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courts have found no constitutional infirmity.7 Therefore, at present
the success of a constitutional attack on mandatory maternity leave
policies necessarily depends upon the jurisdiction in which an action is
brought.
Recently, Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended;8
as a consequence, teachers are no longer excluded from its coverage,9
and future actions alleging that mandatory maternity leave policies con-
stitute sex discrimination under the Act are likely.
This Comment will analyze the Tide VII and equal protection chal-
lenges to mandatory maternity leave and will conclude that possible
procedural and substantive limitations on the statutory scheme may
necessitate a resolution of the issue on equal protection grounds. Ac-
cordingly, particular emphasis will be given to a resolution of the
existing conflict of authority over the constitutionality of mandatory
maternity leave policies.
THE EFFECT OF TITLE VII UPoN MANDATORY
MATERNITY LEAVE PoLIcms
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an attempt to elim-
inate discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.' Although the Act was a significant step toward the elimina-
(leave after five months violated equal protection); Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area
School Dist., 5 EPD 8410 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 1973) (No. 359), ree'g 3 Pa. C'm'w'lth
665, 285 A.2d 206 (1971) (leave after five months was sex discrimination).
7. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir, Jan. 15, 1973),
cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1973) (leave after five months did not
violate equal protection); Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th
Cir. 1972) (leave after seven months did not violate equal protection); Struck v. Secre-
tary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded for consideration
of mootess, 41 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1972) (discharge of pregnant WAF did
not violate equal protection).
8. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
9. See notes 11-15 infra & accompanying text.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) provides in part that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
* terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
... sex ... or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (emphasis supplied).
THt primary purpose of -the 'Act was the elimination of racial discrimination in hiring
1027
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don of discriminatory practices, it did not provide complete protection
against discrimination in the employment field. For example, coverage
did not extend to governmental employers." Hence, a Title VII
action by an aggrieved state employee could not be maintained. Al-
though there were early attempts to revise Title VII,' 2 it was not
until the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972's was enacted
that teachers were given standing'4 to challenge the employment prac-
tices of educational institutions. 15 Clearly, discrimination by a school
board may now be attacked; however, invalidation of maternity leave
policies under Title VII requires a determination that such policies
constitute sex discrimination.
Sex Discrimination Guidelines
Implementing the various provisions of Title VII, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) has promulgated inter-
and promotion policies. It seems clear that the prohibition against sex discrimination was
not included to protect women, but rather was an attempt by the opponents of the Act to
complicate its provisions and thus assist in its defeat. The inclusion of "sex" in Title
VII was proposed by Cong. Smith (D-Va.) in the House Rules Committee. The only
Congressmen vocally supporting the amendment all voted against the final bill. 110
CONG. Rxc. 2804-05 (1964). However, every Congressman voicing opposition to the
sex amendment voted for the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 2804. See also Comment, Sex
Discrimination in Employment or Can Nettie Play Professional Football?, 4 U. SAN
FRAN. L. REv. 323, 334 (1970); 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 923, 929 (1971); Note, Sex Discrhnina-
tion in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 1968 DuKE L.J. 671, 677.
11: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970): "The term 'employer' . . . does not include ...
a State or political subdivision thereof. . . ." Another problem with the Act was that
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission did not have direct enforcement
powers. This was a result of a filibuster by southern Senators. See Berg, Equal Ez-
ployment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62,
66-68 (1964). See also 78 HARV. L. REv. 684 (1965); Comment, Enforcement of Fair
Employnent Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 430 (1965).
Under the final version, primary responsibility for enforcement was left to the indi-
vidual complainant, and only in a case of general public import could the Attorney
General intervene. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5 (e) (1970).
12. See generally the bills introduced by Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), 111 CONG.
REC. 13472-73 (1965); 112 CONG. REc. 6091 (1966).
13. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). For a general discussion of the 1972 Act
see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972).
14. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Star. 103 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1970). This inclusion has added over 10 million employees to the jurisdiction of the
EEOC.
15.- Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Star. 103 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970).
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pretive guidelines. 16 Recently devised Sex Discrimination Guidelines17
support the contention that mandatory maternity leave policies dis-
criminate against female teachers. The EEOC has determined that "a
Written or unwritten employment practice which excludes from em-
ployment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is a prima facie
violation of Title VII." 18 Thus, it is arguable that mandatory leave
policies "exclude" pregnant teachers from employment in violation of
the EEOC directive. In addition, the guidelines provide that pregnancy
should be treated like any other temporary disability.'9 Normally, an
individual's doctor determines when a leave of absence should be taken;
in maternity cases, however, the school board independently estab-
lishes a time at which all pregnant teachers must take their leave.20
Such practice arguably contravenes the guidelines.
Prior to the issuance of the present directives, the EEOC consid-
ered a regulation which required termination of employment during
the sixth month of pregnancy and concluded that it constituted sex
discrimination. 21 This decision, viewed as an expression of EEOC in-
tent, supports the contention that the prohibitions against sex discrim-
ination in the new guidelines extend to maternity leave policies. Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court has held that the EEOC interpretation of
Title VII is entitled to "great deference." 22 This is consistent with a
See also 118 CONG. REC. 3461 (daily ed. March 6, 1972) (explanation of provisions
by Sen. Williams).
16. The duties and powers of the EEOC are enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f.)
.(1970).
* 17. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1972).
"18. Id.
-19. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972).
20. See cases cited in notes 6-7 supra.
21. EEOC Decision No, 70-360, Case No. YAU 9-026 (Dec. 16, 1969).
22. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971): "The administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference. Since
the Act and its legislative history support the Commission's construction, this affords
good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress." (Citations
omitted).
The amount of deference which the courts will give the revised EEOC guidelines
raises heretofore unpresented questions about additional consequences of the guidelines.
In its I972 revisions, the Commission inserted its opinion that disabilities due to preg-
nancy are temporary disabilities and should be treated as such. 29 C.F.R. 5 1604.10(b)
(1972). 'Prior to the recent revisions, some teachers challenging the maternity leave
policies presented the argument that pregnancy should be regarded as any other tem-
porary disability. See Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd, No. 71-1707 (4th Cir.
Jan. 15, ,1973), rev'g 326 F. Supp. 1159 (ED. Va. 1971), cert. granted, 41 U.SL.W.
3565 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1973); Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ, 4 EPD 7773 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist, 3 Pa. Cmwlth. 665, 285 A.2d 206
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general policy of statutory construction-deference to agency exper7
tise. 3 However, it has been suggested that the Court may have weak-
ened this policy when it recently refused to apply the EEOC guidelines
to a questionable employment practice. 4 Nevertheless, the EEOC
guidelines appear to control all cases involving mandatory maternity
leave.
Two methods do exist, however, by which mandatory termination
policies could be upheld regardless of the weight to be ascribed to the
guidelines. First, the guidelines do not forbid mandatory maternity
leave policies explicitly. In a recent labor dispute,25 the arbitrator, after
reviewing the Sex Discrimination Guidelines, asserted:
The EEOC guidelines [regarding pregnancy] do not require that
an employee be permitted to work until any particular time prior
to the birth of her child, or that she must be permitted to return
to work at any particular time after birth of her child. All the
guidelines require is that pregnancy be treated like any other tem-
porary disability, which would appear to permit the employer
some latitude .... 26
This type of "latitude" in construction of the guidelines provides a basis
for subsequent holdings to the effect that mandatory leave policies are
valid under Title VII.
(1971). The courts have not been inclined to accept the argument. However, in the
cases now on appeal, medical testimony alone supported the teachers' argument; the
revised guidelines now strengthen their contentions. The mandatory maternity leave
policies currently under challenge provide for leaves of absence without pay. If the
courts defer to the Commission's opinion that pregnancy should be treated as any other
temporary disability, the guideline would appear to support the proposition that a
teacher on maternity leave is entitled to the same salary benefits as any other teacher
who suffers a temporary disability.
23. See generally Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v.
Electricians Union, 367 U.S. 396 (196.1); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Aragon,
329 U.S. 143 (1946).
24. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and re-
vnanded, 400 U.S. 542 (1971). The Supreme Court remanded for a determination of
whether the refusal to hire women with pre-school age children was a bona fide occu-
pational qualification, and thus an exception to the protection under Title VII. For a
further discussion of Phillips see notes 52-55 infra & accompanying text. See also
Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32
Orno ST. L.J. 923, 924 (1971).
25. Board of Educ., Union Free School Dist. No. 7 and Depew Teacher's Org. 1 CCH
Eumr. PRAc. t 5092 (May 17, 1972).
26. 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. 5092, at 3172.
1030 [Vol. 14:1026
MATERNITY LEAVe1
Moreover, the guidelines do not have the force of law, and deference
to agency expertise notwithstanding, a court is not bound by administra-
tive interpretation. This proposition is supported by language in Cohen
v. Chesterfield County School Board,2 7 where a teacher was required to
commence maternity leave four months prior to the expected birth of
her child.28 She challenged the school board regulation 9 as violative
of the equal protection clause,30 but the regulation was upheld. Although
the decision was based on constitutional grounds,'1 the court, by stat-
ing that the mandatory maternity leave regulation was not an "invidious
disciimination based upon sex," 32 necessarily suggested that the same
result may have obtained had the action been brought under Title VII.83
Assuming, arguendo, that the courts will follow the EEOC guidelines
and conclude that mandatory maternity leave policies are unlawful
sex discrimination, teachers still must confront two problems presented
by Title VII itself. The first obstacle is procedural; the second relates
to the major exception to Title VII coverage-the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification, which permits discrimination in specified situations.
27. No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973), ree'g 326 F. Supp. 1159 (ED. Va. 1971),
cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1973).
28. Mrs. Susan Cohen informed the School Board on or about November 2, 1970,
that she was pregnant and that her estimated date of delivery was April 28, 1971. With
the consent of her obstetrician she requested a maternity leave to commence on April 1,
1971. The school board regulation, however, required women teachers to take a leave
of absence at the end of the fifth month of pregnancy, and leave was granted effective
December 18, 1970. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd, 326 F. Supp. 1159 (ED.
Va. 1971).
29. The applicable provisions of the Chesterfield County School Board regulations
provide:
a. Notice in writing must be given to the School Board at least six (6)
months prior to the date of expected birth.
b. Termination of employment of an expectant mother shall become effec-
tive at least four (4) months prior to the expected birth of the child. Termi-
nation of employment may be extended if the superintendent receives writ-
ten recommendations from the expectant mother's physician and her princi-
pal, and if the superintendent determines that an extension will be in the best
interest of the pupils and school involved.
No. 71-1707, at 3 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973).
30. 326 F. Supp. at 1159.
31. No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973) (no equal protection violation because the
leave policy served a reasonable state interest).
32. Id. at 5 (emphasis supplied).
33. It should be noted that in Cohen the statement concerning sex discrimination was
dicta. If the court had had under consideration the more explicit language of the guide-
lines, the mandatory maternity leave policies may have been found to constitute sex
discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.
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EEOC Procedural Difficulties
Tide VII requires prompt action by an aggrieved employee. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 stipulated that an action had to be commenced
within 90 days of the alleged discriminatory practice. 4 Although
the 1972 amendment extends this period to 180 days,35 the essential
problem remains-if an employee, either through neglect or ignorance,
fails to file a complaint shortly after the alleged violation occurs, relief
may be denied. While many courts have interpreted the time period
quite liberally,"8 one district court has denied relief on this basis.37 The
difference in result appears to hinge upon whether the discriminatory
action was a continuing practice or a single event. If the objectionable
practice is non-recurring, actions brought after the statute has run will
be barred. More leeway is afforded, however, when the action is pred-
icated on continuing violations. 8 Since mandatory leave arguably is
a non-continuing discriminatory act, teachers who fail to bring timely
actions may be denied Title VII protection.
Another procedural difficulty is the Act's requirement that the EEOC
defer charges of discrimination to the appropriate state or local agency
in those jurisdictions which have provided a statutory vehicle to redress
discriminatory employment practices.3 9 Such deferral encourages the
application of varying standards, thus inhibiting uniform enforcement
of the Act. Furthermore, requiring an employee to exhaust his state
remedies delays appropriate federal relief.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970).
35. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 103 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(d)
(1970).
36. See, e.g., Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971), where the court stated that "[i]t is settled law that the
ninety day limitation is no bar when a continuing practice of discrimination is being
challenged. rather than a single, isolated discriminatory act" (emphasis supplied). See
also Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); King v. Georgia
Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968). -
37. Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1970) (failure to
file an action within 90 days in regard to an alleged discriminatory lay-off. prevented
plaintiff from suing for damages).
38. Id. at 1153.
39. 4Z U.S.C. H§ 2000e-5(b)-(c) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 4(a), 86
Star. 103 -(1972), The deferral to a state or local agency does- not, preclude eventual,
EEOC action. The charge is deferred for a "reasonable time" which cannot be less than
60 days; after such period, the EEOC can take action with respect to the charge.
1032 [Vol. 14:1026
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Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception con-
tained in Title VII creates a second potential obstacle for pregnant
teachers seeking relief under the Act. If the courts determine that
pregnancy is a bona fide occupational disqualification, protection from
sex discrimination in employment will be denied. The BFOQ excep-
tion permits discrimination "in those certain instances where religion,
sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise... ." Although the provisions specifically exempt discrim-
inatory practices only in the initial hiring process, recent court deci-
sions '41 statements of commentators, 42 and interpretations by the EEOC43
indicate that the exemption is applicable to the terms of employment
as well.
Courts which have considered the BFOQ exception have accepted
the EEOC position that it be narrowly construed.44 Clearly, such a
construction comports with congressional intent as expressed in the
legislative history of the Act.45 In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e) (1) (1970).
In construing the BFOQ exception, the Commission has taken notice of state laws
which limit the employment of women at certain periods of time before and after
childbirth. The EEOC guidelines include the Commission's opinion that "such laws
and regulations do not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of
individual females and therefore discriminate on the basis of sex. The Commission has
concluded that such laws and regulations conflict with and are superseded by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, such laws will not be considered
a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis for
the application of the bona fide, occupational qualification exception." 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2(b) (1) (1972).
41. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (BFOQ applied to
sex discrimination in promotion policies); Staten v. East Hartford Bd. of Educ,
1 CCH EmwL. PRAc. 5055 (Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights, 1972) (Board of
Education has to prove preguancy is a BFOQ to justify mandatory leave after five
months). See also Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (WD.
Tex. 1971); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971).
42. Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 DENVER Lj. 344, 362
(1967); Comment, Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7
HAv. Civ. RI G-rs-Crv. LiB. L. REv.,260, 265 (1972).
43. See Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae, Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n,
330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a) (1972).
45. A memorandum introduced in the Senate by Senators Clark and Case stated that
the BFOQ exception was to be only a "limited exception." 110 CoNG. REc. 7213 (1964).
At the time that the two floor sponsors offered their memorandum, the word "sex" had
not been added to the characteristics which the Act prohibited as a basis for discrim-
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and Telegraph,46 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, defining
the limits of the BFOQ exception, held that "in order to rely on the
bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer has the
burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a
factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would
be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job in-
volved." 47 Moreover, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
48
the same court stated that discriminatory practices "reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of . . . [a] business" 49 will be tested by
a "business necessity" rather than a "business convenience" standard.50
Therefore, it appears that in order to justify employment discrimina-
tion as a bona fide occupational qualification, an employer faces a diffi-
cult burden of proof. He must demonstrate that substantially all women
would be unable to perform the job efficiently, that the qualification
is necessitated by compelling business factors, and that the classification
based on sex is not the result of a stereotyped image.5'
The Fifth Circuit's interpretations of the BFOQ exception suggest
that it presents no obstacle to a pregnant teacher's recovery under the
Act. However, a recent decision by the Supreme Court involving sex
discrimination raises the possibility that the BFOQ exception might
create such an obstacle. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,52 the Court
remanded for a determination of whether the fact that a woman had
pre-school age children was a sufficient BFOQ to deny her employ-
ment 3 This decision would seem to weaken the impact of the EEOC
guidelines and also place a lesser burden of proof on the employer."
ination in employment. "Sex" was subsequently added to the provisions of the statute,
and there is no reason to believe that the construction given the BFOQ exception by
the memorandum does not apply to a BFOQ exception based on sex discrimination.
46. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th
Cir. 1969).
47. 408 F.2d at 235.
48. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) (1972).
50. 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971).
51. See generally Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination
and Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 232 (1965); Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupa-
tional Qualification, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 395 (1968).
52. 400 U.S. 542 (1971), vacating and remanding per curiam 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1969) (the BFOQ was never raised as a possible defense, but was suggested by the
Court).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 544-47 (Marshal, J., concurring).
[Vol. 14:10261034
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One commentator believes "[i]t is possible that by ignoring the EEOC
guidelines and suggesting the possibility of a BFOQ exception, the
Court thereby undermined the protection of the Act in a manner
which could leave women in the position they were in under the
Constitution before the passage of the Act." " It is also possible that
the BFOQ exception may apply when pregnancy is involved. Were
the courts to determine that having pre-school age children comes
within the BFOQ exception, the argument that pregnancy also con-
stitutes a bona fide occupational disqualification would be strengthened.
This possible interpretation of the BFOQ exception, coupled with
the procedural difficulties under Tide VII, may limit the protection
afforded pregnant teachers under the Act. Thus, it becomes impera-
tive that a final determination as to the status of mandatory maternity
leave policies be made in light of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of equal protection under the law.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Equal Protection
The mere classification of people into separate groups for the purpose
of enforcing a particular law is not prohibited by the fourteenth amend-
ment. 6 However, the equal protection clause does require that any
such grouping be justified. In the past, justification has been found if
a classification system met either of two tests. 5r
Traditionally, courts have presumed that a classification is constitu-
tional unless it can be shown that it is based upon grounds "wholly
irrelevant" 51 to the realization of a valid state purpose. Under the tra-
ditional test, a classification is invalidated only when the complainant
demonstrates that such classification lacks any "rational basis" or rea-
sonable relation to the achievement of a permissible state objective. 9
55. Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
32 Omo ST. L.J. 923, 924-25 (1971).
56. For a detailed consideration of mandatory maternity leave policies as violative of
the equal protection guarantee see Comment, Mandatory Maternity Leave of Absence
Policies-An Equal Protection Analysis, 45 Thw. L.Q. 240 (1972); 38 BROouL.N L.
REv. 789 (1972); 40 U. GN. L. Rav. 857 (1971).
57. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HtMv. L. REv.
1065, 1076-1132 (1969).
58. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
59. The Supreme Court expressed the rationale for the traditional test as follows:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
19731 1035
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A second test is applied, however, in cases where the classification
threatens certain "fundamental rights" 6 or where it is based upon
certain "suspect" criteria.61 In such situations, the courts examine the
grouping with stricter judicial scrutiny, and in those cases where funda-
mental rights are involved, a "compelling state interest" 62 must be
demonstrated for the classification to be upheld. That mandatory
maternity leave regulations place a pregnant teacher in a class separate
from all other teachers is clear. Whether this classification violates the
equal protection clause, and more importantly, whether the consti-
tutionality of mandatory maternity leave can be resolved adequately
by applying either of the present tests must be considered.
Most courts which have examined mandatory maternity leave policies
have applied the rational basis test to determine their constitutionality.
Under this test, the burden is on the complainant to demonstrate that
the classification lacks a rational basis. Were the challenged policies
judged by the stricter standard, the burden would fall on the defendant
to prove that the state interests which support the discriminatory
from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and there-
fore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathe-
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When
the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957), citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Go., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
60. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
61. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
62. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Kramer v. Union School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
63. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973),
rev'g 326 F. Supp. 1159 (ED. Va. 1971), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 24,
1973); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'g 326
F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1973);
Pocklington v. Duval County School Bd., 345 F. Supp. 163 (ND. Fla. 1972); Bravo v.
Board of Educ, 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. IM. 1972); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ.,
345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
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classification are compelling. Understandably, aggrieved teachers have
sought judicial acceptance of the compelling state interest test. One
theory advanced to support its adoption is that maternity leave regu-
lations violate the teacher's fundamental right to work.64 Although
language in an early Supreme Court decision is cited occasionally in
support of the right to work, 5 the Court has not recognized such a
right specifically. Support for the proposition is lacking in the lower
courts as well. Consequently, judicial approval of the compelling state
interest test on the basis of this questionable fundamental right seems
doubtful.
A stronger argument for stricter judicial scrutiny of mandatory leave
regulations is that a classification based upon sex is inherently suspect.66,
This proposition finds support in two recenf decisions. In United States
ex rel. Robinson v. York,67 a federal district court noted that classifica-
tions based upon race were acknowledged to be suspect and suggested
that no logical reason could be discerned for providing women any
less protection."8 The California Supreme Court' drew the analogy
between classification based upon race 'and sex in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby,6 9 ' and likewise concluded that sex'should be included among the
criteria which are recognized as suspect classifications. 70 Moreover,
64. Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ, No. 72-1676, (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973); Williams
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
65. Speaking for the Court, Justice Hughes stated: "It requires no argument to show
that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of
the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure." Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
66. Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973) at 1727.
See 'generally Comment, Are Sex-Bas-ed Classifications Constitutibnally Suspect?, 66
Nw. UJL. REv. 481 (1971).
67. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (statute requiring longer sentences for women
than for men convicted of the same crime).
68. "Vhile the Supreme Court has not explicitly determined whether equal protec-.
tion rights of women should be tested by this rigid standard, it is difficult to find any
reason why adult women, as one of the specific groups that compose humanity, should
have a lesser measure of protection than a racial group." Id. at 14.
69. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (statute restricting bartending
by women).
70. A n ualysis of classifications 'which the Supreme* Court has previously
designated as suspect reveals why sex is properly placed among them.
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into which the
class members are locked by the accident of birth. What differentiates sex
from nonsuspect statuses, such as intelligence or physical disability, and
aligns it with the recognized suspect classifications is that the characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.
id.'at 18, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
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the Supreme Court presently has under review a case in which the issue
of sex as a suspect criteria may be resolved. 71 The analogy of sex to
the inherently suspect classifications based upon race has merit. The
judicial acceptance of the analogy supports the efforts of teachers who
propose the use of the compelling state interest test in cases involving
maternity leave policies. Whether the "state interest" or "rational basis"
test controls the equal protection inquiry, however, may now be of
less significance.
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that equal protection analy-
sis should not be regarded as an application of two separate tests but
rather as an effort to answer fundamental questions inherent in all equal
protection cases. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,72 Mr.
Justice Powell, after reviewing the cases which depict separate degrees
of judicial scrutiny, concluded that the "essential inquiry" in all equal
protection cases is "inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest
does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?" 73 In Police Dep't v. Mosley74 the
Court found the "crucial question" to be "whether there is an appro-
priate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treat-
ment." 7 The Court's emphasis on a common approach to all equal
protection questions evidences a shift to a greater balancing of state
and personal interests. The suggestion that the Court places increased
emphasis on a balancing approach in equal protection cases finds further
support in other language utilized by the Court during the 1971 term.
In both Weber and Reed v. Reed, 6 the Court stressed that a classifica-
tion by which the law treats people differently must have a significant
or substantial relation to an appropriate state purpose.77 The require-
71. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (3-judge court), prob.
jurir. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972), argued before the Supreme Court on
January 14, 1973, and now sub judice (female uniformed military officer alleges she
is entitled to receive the same quarters allowance and medical and dental benefits for
her spouse that a male member of the uniformed services would receive for his spouse).
72. 92 S. Ct. 1400 (1972) (state workmen's compensation law which discriminated
against dependent, illegitimate children).
73. Id. at 1405.
74.92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972) (city ordinance restricting certain types of peaceful picketing
because of subject matter).
75. Id. at 2290.
76. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statute which discriminated against women in the appoint-
ment of an administrator of decedents estate).
77. In Weber, the Court coficluded that the challenged classification had '"no signifi-
cant relationship to those recognized purposes" for which workmen's compensation
statutes are enacted. 92 S. Ct. 1400, 1406 (1972). The Court in Reed stated: "A classifi-
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ment of a "substantial relation" indicates that the presumption of
validity inherent in the rational basis test has been weakened. Seem-
ingly, whichever test is now applied, sufficient rationale must be ad-
vanced to justify the classifications imposed by the state.
Striking a Balance
It is submitted that whether mandatory maternity leave regulations
violate the fourteenth amendment is an issue best resolved by balancing
the state's need for such policies against the teacher's right to equal
protection of the laws. To better understand what individual rights
and public interests are involved, it is necessary to analyze the argu-
ments advanced by the teachers and by the school boards.
The teachers' basic claim has been that a law which fails to consider
the physical capability of the individual and which treats pregnancy
differently from other temporary disabilities, deprives the pregnant
teacher of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.78 In sup-
port of the contention that pregnancy should be treated like other
temporary disabilities, the teachers have produced substantial medical
evidence indicating that women four or five months pregnant are cap-
able of full-time employment.7 9 However, it should be noted that some
cation 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. .. :" 404 US.
71, 76 (1971), citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
78. See, e.g., Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973);
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973), cert.
granted, 41 USL.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1973); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ,
465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the question of procedure involving an
unwed pregnant teacher raises additional considerations of social attitudes and the type
of example the teacher is expected to set for her students. The problem is particularly
acute since an unwed father is not restricted in any way. There is a recent case
which held that the discharge of an unmarried, pregnant office worker after her fifth
month was a violation of equal protection. Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp.
1357 (D. Kan. 1971). It is submitted, however, that barring a change in social custom
and attitude, the courts may well uphold a mandatory leave provision directed to
unwed teachers.
79. See Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973) at
1731-32; LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1187-89 (6th Cir. 1972);
Bravo v. Board of Educ, 345 F. Supp. 155, 158 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Williams v. San Fran-
cisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The doctors testify-
ing for the teachers in these cases have found no medically justifiable reason for termi-
nating a teacher's employment after four, five or even seven months of pregnancy.
The physicians have stressed the need to determine a woman's pre- and post-delivery
absence from employment on a case by case basis.
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medical evidence exists which indicates that a working woman's effi-
ciency is decreased as pregnancy becomes more advanced.80
School boards have suggested a number of interests to justify their
policy of classifying pregnant teachers for purposes of mandatory
leave, while not similarly classifying any other group of temporarily
disabled teachers. One argument urges that because women comprise
the overwhelming majority of teachers, a rule directing mandatory
maternity leave is necessary for administrative convenience.8' The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that administrative efficiency is a
legitimate state objective;8 2 however, the Court has emphasized that,
when weighed against constitutional rights and guarantees, the latter
must prevail.88 In Reed, after striking down a policy of sex discrimina-
tion in the appointment of an administrator for an intestate's estate, the
Court concluded that a mandatory preference based on sex "merely
to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." S4 It is submitted that
the selection of an arbitrary termination date many months before a
teacher is medically unable to perform efficiently also is an "arbitrary
legislative choice" and cannot of itself justify mandatory maternity
leave.
80. Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32, 39 (5th Cir. 1972). The
doctor in this case testified that a woman after seven months of pregnancy becomes
irritable, and difficult to employ, has frequent headaches, and extensive swelling of the,
limbs. For these reasons the doctor opined that a pregnant woman's efficiency was'
reduced in the eighth and ninth month of. pregnancy and termination of employment at
that time was reasonable.
81. See, e.g., Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., No. 71-1707, at 12 (4th Cir. Jan.
15, 1973); cf. LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1187 (6th Cir. 1972).
82. In Reed v. Reed, the Court recognized that "the objective of reducing the work-
load on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without some legiti-
macy." 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The Supreme Court acknowledged the value of admin-
istrative efficiency in another case during the same term: "The establishment of prompt
efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy
of cognizance in constitutional adjudication." Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1215
(1972). See also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
83. 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972). The Court stated: "[Tihe Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy which may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones." Id. at 1215.
84. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
[Vol. 14:1026
MATERNITY LEAVE
School boards also have maintained that without a specified depar-
ture date, continuity in the students' education will be disrupted.,, It
is argued that continuity requires permanent replacements rather than
temporary substitutes and that fixed termination dates afford a school
board sufficient lead time to find a permanent replacement and to
ensure certainty of the replacement date. However, the purported
need for a specified date of departure could be satisfied through indi-
vidual arrangements which consider the interests of both the school and
the teacher. Finally, school boards have asserted that concern for the
health and safety of both the teacher and her child justifies terminating
employment at a specified time.8 6 This argument is advanced primarily
by urban school boards where violence in schools is most prevalent.
However, the boards fail to indicate why pregnant teachers should be
protected from this violence while pregnant students are allowed to
remain in school for as long as they are physically capable., 7
'The 'arguments advanced by the teachers and those urged by, school
boards have found judicial acceptance.8 Due to this obvious clash of
apparently valid interests, courts should balance the alternatives and
find an equilibrium point satisfactory to both. It is suggested that such
an approach is appropriate for at least two reasons. First, the validity
of the state's interests is a function of time-state interests become more
compelling in each succeeding month of pregnancy. Moreover, the
Supreme Court in its recent decisions on state abortion regulations em-
ployed a time-frame approach to balance state and individual interests.8 9
Although these cases were argued on due process grounds, the conclu-
sions of the Court are sufficiently analogous to the maternity leave situa-
tion to support the contention that pregnancy-related problems likewise
_85. See, e.k., Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15,
1973> at 11-12; Bravo-v. Board'of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155, 158 (N.D. InI. 1972).
86. See, e.g., Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973)
at 1732; LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1187 (6th Cir. 1972) rev'g
326 F. Supp. 1208, 1210-11 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
87. This inconsistency is recognized in Comment, Mandatory Maternity Leave of
Absence Policies-An Equal Protection Analysis, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 240, 245 (1972). The
Cleveland School Board required teachers to take mandatory maternity leave after the
fourth month of pregnancy but had no comparable regulation for pregnant students.
88. Compare Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan.
15, 1973) and Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972)
with Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973) and
LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
89. Doe v. Bolton, 41 U.SL..W. 4233 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973); Roe v. Wade, 41 U.SJ.W.
4213 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973).
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should be treated in stages when such treatment will aid in balancing
state interests and individual rights.
To strike the proper balance between the conflicting interests of
the state and the pregnant teacher, the following approach is suggested:
1. In the first seven months of pregnancy, the decision when to termi-
nate employment should be left to the individual teacher with the
advice of her physician. To protect the school board, reasonable
advance notice of this decision should be required.
2. In the eighth month of pregnancy, the state may regulate the termi-
nation date of pregnant teachers in a manner shown to be reasonably
related to a legitimate state interest.
3. From the end of the eighth month to term, it should be assumed
that the interests of the state in the health of the pregnant teacher
and in the continuity of education become compelling. Therefore,
enforcement of mandatory maternity leave regulations during this
period should be permitted.
The proposed solution takes cognizance of valid competing interests;
more importantly, it recognizes the varying weights to be given those
interests as a pregnancy approaches term. In the first seven months of
pregnancy, the teacher is afforded treatment similar to any other tem-
porarily disabled teacher. In order to require a teacher to take ma-
ternity leave in the eighth month of pregnancy, a state must show that
its regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. When
its interests become compelling, however, the state is given maximum
freedom to regulate. A mandatory leave regulation after the eighth
month will enable the state to establish a definite date for the purpose
of hiring a permanent replacement, will provide certainty in the ad-
ministrative process, and will safeguard sufficiently the health of both
teacher and child.
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